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our law firm just launched a website to increase
its exposure in the local community and beyond. The
team who designed the site invested endless hours,
effort, and resources conducting market research, per-
fecting program design, and performing technical
upgrades of the support systems. The finished product
reflects their hard work; the site is sleek and sophisti-
cated, yet user-friendly and reliable. And best of all (at
least from one perspective), you have a profile page on
the site.
One evening while working on your monthly bills, it
dawns on you that you haven't shown your family the
new site. Eager to show off a bit-after all, your picture
is on the Internet now-you minimize the program
you're working on and open your web browser. You call
to your wife, your twelve-year-old daughter, and your
seven-year-old son.
When all three arrive, you click the search icon of
your browser so that you can show them how prospec-
tive clients can find your firm's site using a simple key-
word search. The design team, you explain, put a lot of
thought into the site's metatags1 in order to make the
site easy to find. Using the search engine, 2 you type in
a few words that best describe your firm's area of prac-
tice, your city, and the word "law." The results do not
disappoint; displayed prominently, fourth from the top,
is a link to your firm's website. You double-click on it
and the site downloads-leaving you, your wife, and
your two children looking at three naked women. The
address of the site you are on is not your firm's website,
but <www.taboo.com>. You stab at your browser's back
button, but another porn site pops up, this time it is
"TabooSisters.com." More explicit images fill your
screen. Surprise now gives way to anger as you thrash
with the mouse, trying to click the close button of your
browser. The second you succeed, "Daily
Sexgames.com" appears, complete with banner ads for
companion sites offering pictures of unnatural sexual
acts with animals. You ask aloud, "what's going on?" as
your wife hurries your children from the room while
shooting you an angry look.
You click on the browser's back button again, and
another porn site pops up. Each attempt to leave these
sites or to close your browser causes another porn site
to open. You then attempt to restore the minimized pro-
gram in order to save your work. But the deluge of porn
sites has caused your computer to freeze up. You con-
template shutting down your computer, but you know
doing so will cause you to lose all of the unsaved work.
Additionally, you know that shutting down your com-
puter with programs open can damage their operation,
not to mention your hard drive. But then again, you see
no other option at this point. So, frustrated and deject-
ed, you slowly press the power button and watch as the
monitor goes dark.
To make matters worse, your wife returns looking for
an explanation. She thinks that you were visiting these
pornography sites before she and the kids came into the
room. You declare your innocence, but you have no
explanation as to how these sites appeared when you
hit the back button. Unbeknownst to you, a company
specializing in cyber-scams engineered your entire
World Wide Web ordeal by catching you in a "web" of its
own. First, they hijacked or "cyberjacked" your firm's
website by reposting a version that redirects unsuspect-
ing visitors to the never-ending series of pornographic
sites you now know a little too well. Having captured
you inside that ring, the pornography company used a
technique called "mousetrapping" to frustrate all efforts
to leave, keeping you firmly held in their grip. In short,
while you may not have known about it before it hap-
pened to you (or possibly even afterwards), you've just
fallen victim to the latest rage in Internet fraud-a
scam as effective as it is invisible, as simple to execute
as it is hard to regulate.
Currently, for example, only the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) can bring a federal cause of action
against a company whose business practices or actions
deceive consumers.3 However, the FTC's power is limit-
ed; it can intervene on behalf of consumers only when
there is a pattern of misconduct by the business that
threatens the public interest. 4 But where the scams
themselves are difficult to spot, patterns may be virtu-
ally impossible to establish. Moreover, even successful
FTC actions may yield little in the way of preventative
or compensatory benefit for the indi-
vidual user.
My aim in this Note, therefore, is
to offer one possible means of pro-
viding a happy ending to the story of
deceptive trade practices on the
Internet. The first section briefly
addresses the background of the
Internet, its technical aspects, and the current state of
Internet regulation. Next, an overview of the FTC's
"deceptive trade practices" cause of action, using the
recent Federal Trade Commission v. Pereira 5 case will
give an extended illustration of not only the mechanics
of modern cyber-scams, but also the efficacy of current
regulatory and protective regimes aimed at stopping
them. Finally, I will propose that the FTC Act should be
amended to give private citizens a cause of action
against deceptive trade practices and fraud on the
Internet, and that such an amendment should offer
enhanced damages and attorneys' fees in order to
encourage use of the action. This private cause of action
would broaden the regulatory ability of the Act without
risking the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists on the Internet.
THE INTERNET: HISTORY AND REGULATION
While the Internet is no longer a novel concept, its
history and the technology behind it often still is. The
story begins with a secret U.S. Department of Defense
feasibility study, started in 1969, called the Advanced
Research Projects Agency network (ARPAnet).6 This
study tested methods of enabling computerized com-
mand and control networks to survive conventional and
nuclear attack by means of the high-speed rerouting of
messages.
Of course, the primary uses these days are far less
dramatic. In fact, the most common uses of today's
Internet revolve around a single element of the whole,
the World Wide Web. The web is a collection of globally
distributed text, multimedia documents, files, and other
network services linked to create an immense electron-
ic library from which information can be retrieved
quickly by intuitive searches on a search engine.7 To
allow the information to be easily accessible, the web
uses hypertext technology8 and a graphical interface to
provide easy-to-understand links between related areas
of content, which may reside on the same computer or
be distributed across many computers around the
world. These links enable the user to change seamless-
ly between different files or even combine these ele-
ments.
The web itself consists of three main elements. The
HyperText Markup Language (HTML) comprises the
programming codes, or tags, that define fonts, layouts,
embedded graphics, and links to other documents acces-
i te-ne n te
sible via the web. The HyperText Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) defines a set of standards for transmitting web
pages across the Internet. The Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) is a standardized naming convention for
identifying a web document or file-in a sense, it is the
address of a website. 9 The United States Government
once licensed URLs, but for the last several years they
have been controlled by private companies (one of the
largest is Network Solutions, located in Virginia).
Putting all of these elements together, the basic struc-
ture of the web becomes apparent. Programmers use
HTML to combine varying forms of content into web-
sites that users may access via HTTP at specified
URLs-and all with just a few simple clicks of a mouse
button.
Of course, technical descriptions of any aspect of the
Internet often miss their true social and cultural impor-
tance. Imagine, for instance, describing a book as sev-
eral ounces of paper, held together by glue, each con-
taining ink placed onto the paper in such a way so as to
convey messages in a language that allows the person
viewing the ink to receive them. Just as the real impor-
tance of books lies in the elegance of Eliot's verse or the
passion of Dostoevsky's prose, so too does the true value
of the Internet come from the ability it gives to its users
to access an immense amount of information (including
the complete works of both of the above) and to commu-
nicate with an extensive number of people.
But this value-the virtual eradication of barriers to
communication and information transfers-may also be
the hazard of the Internet. As a technological device,
the Internet surpasses even the printing press for its
ability to spur change. 10 Just as the advent of the print-
ing press caused society to rethink the legal framework
concerning property, the Internet has caused society to
rethink jurisprudence that spans the legal spectrum
from international intellectual property law to the pro-
tection of children. Thus, questions of how and to whom
the vast libraries of information on the Internet will be
made available have become the primary concerns
behind attempts at regulation.
For instance, obviously not all information is appro-
priate for all audiences. Most would agree that some
information, such as pornography, should be restricted
only to adults. Arguably, other information, such as
design details for weapons of mass destruction, should
be restricted altogether. But when geographical bor-
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ders and other tangible reference points become blurred
or obscured-as they often do on the Internet-effective
regulation of even the most uncontroversial subjects
can be difficult to devise. Then add in other fundamen-
S 5NN -Y
experienced the force of this customary law punishment
when, while trying to generate business, it sent out an
advertisement to several newsgroups. In response to
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over 30,000 reply mes-
sages, the bulk of which
crashed their systems and
resulted in the cancella-
tion of their Internet serv-
ice. 14
However, the develop-
ment of such practices,
and indeed the Internet's




fall within three basic cat-
While some contend that the dangers of pornography-
especially for children-justify extensive regulation,
others answer by pointing to another danger, that of sti-
fling Internet activity through over-regulation. These
latter theorists prefer to rely on more traditional
means, such as customary law, to prevent any real dan-
gers of Internet pornography without creating even
more problems along the way. In this light, the debate
over pornography-related regulation transforms into a
set of debates over the effectiveness of customary law
and the legitimacy of governmental regulation.
Practically from its inception, an informal set of cus-
tomary laws has governed the Internet." These laws
consist solely of the generally agreed-upon set of con-
ventions for accessing and interacting in cyberspace.
For instance, convention dictates that users who access
news groups will refrain from making postings that are
off-topic. Such postings can come in many forms,
including the infamous "spam"12 posting. Experts and
novices alike generally consider spam to be both a nui-
sance to users and a potential harm to the systems of
the Internet. Thus, most Internet users frown upon
spamming because it wastes their time, multiplies traf-
fic, and occupies valuable bandwidth.
13
Accordingly, the Internet community has developed
self-governing systems to "punish" spammers. One of
these "punishments" involves "flaming' the spammer
by sending so many messages to his or her account that
it becomes inoperable. The law firm of Canter & Siegel
egories-one based on justice, the second on scope, and
the third on efficacy. The first category demands little
attention here, as it argues simply that all customary
law regimes are akin to mob rule and are not necessar-
ily just.15
The second category, which addresses the scope of
protection offered by customary law, seems slightly
more sophisticated. It argues that such "regulatory"
schemes only address community interaction and either
ignore deviant and criminal activity or place the burden
of protecting one's self directly on the individual. In the
context of pornography, therefore, these critics contend
that the customary law's only answer to unwanted
explicit content is that users should either avoid the
Internet entirely, avoid sites that are offensive, or pur-
chase software that will filter out offensive material.
16
Perhaps ironically, proponents of customary law
seem to agree with this assessment, but still advocate it
as a way of ensuring freedom by making regulation
purely an individual (or parental) choice. For instance,
in her 1997 book Net Wars, Wendy Grossman tries to
debunk what she sees as misinformation about Internet
pornography. Recognizing the reasoning for the regula-
tion of broadcast media, 17 Grossman states, "The Net is
not like television. A surprising ... number of non-Net
users believe that you hit a button to connect to the
Internet and pornography just flows, unwanted and
unbidden, across your computer screen."1 8 Grossman
goes on to state that "[i]n general, pornography on the
net is like anything else on the Net: if you want to find
it, you have to go out looking for it .... -19 Thus,
Grossman implicitly concludes that the individual is
responsible for the content they come into contact
with-and therefore also solely responsible for not com-
ing in contact with content they would wish to avoid.
Lastly, critics also attack the efficacy of customary
law. They claim that because the Internet has changed
from a medium that was largely publicly owned and
regulated by systems-operators to a privately owned
and unregulated medium of communication, customary
law is no longer the effective regulatory regime it once
was.20  In other words, according to this school of
thought, Internet privatization conflicts with the stan-
dards of customary law, leaving the latter without a
viable means of enforcement. For instance, while flam-
ing may work as a deterrent for spamming, it also inter-
feres with the efficiency and profitability of the Internet
economy. After all, if spamming wastes users' time, so
does responding to the spammer; in this way, flaming
merely increases the cost of spam. Since the market
finds this result unappealing, it discourages flaming
almost as strongly as it discourages spamming. In
other words, this last critique of customary law sug-
gests that customary law has simply turned into mar-
In a recent Senate Report concerning the
of Internet filtering systems in schools
libraries, Senator John McCain pointed out
such segment when he stated, "The dai
posed by [Internet pornography] is particu
acute for the nation's children, who are un
to guard themselves with the sophisticatio
an adult."
ket-led regulation, with norms of acceptable behavior
developing "along the lines of market forces and an
industry-regulatory model."
2 1
Of course, the obvious conclusion for such critics of
customary law is that the market will never be able to
regulate the Internet as well as the government. In
particular, these critics point to certain segments of the
Internet population that may be less able to utilize the
"protection" offered by customary law. For example, in
a recent Senate Report concerning the use of Internet
filtering systems in schools and libraries, Senator John
McCain pointed out one such segment when he stated,
ii ternet note
"The danger posed by [Internet pornography] is partic-
ularly acute for the nation's children, who are unable to
guard themselves with the sophistication of an adult.
' 22
Such a statement seems to raise important issues
concerning the utility of customary law. One, if the pro-
tection of customary law is primarily found in self-pro-
tection, how can parents hope to insulate their children
from something like pornography on the Internet?
Even if parents do purchase filtering software-as cus-
tomary law supporters might suggest they should-
their children will likely still have access to the Internet
at school, in public libraries, and at friends' homes.
Thus, the children will ultimately have to protect them-
selves. Of course, the reason for the concern in the first
place comes from the fact that they may not be able to
do so. In the end, critics like McCain seem to uncover a
question that betrays the troublesome circularity of cus-
tomary law: of what use is a system relying on self-pro-
tection when the primary at-risk groups are precisely
those that cannot protect themselves?
The problem is that alternative, governmental forms
of regulation have often been even less successful than
customary law. For instance, in Reno v. ACLU, the
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the first
major congressional attempt to regulate sexually explic-
it content on the Internet.23 Passed in 1997, the
use Communications Decency Act (CDA)24 criminal-
and ized the "knowing transmission of obscene or
one indecent messages to any recipient under 18
nger years of age" and the "knowin[g] sending or dis-
larly playing to a person under 18 of any message
able that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
n of patently offensive as measured by contempo-
rary community standards, sexual or excretory
activities or organs. '25
The ACLU contended not only that such inclusive
language could not survive First Amendment scrutiny,
but also that if it did, its operation would stifle the
growth of the Internet in its critical early stages. The
Supreme Court agreed.26 Writing for the majority,
Justice Stevens commented that "users seldom
encounter such content accidentally."27 Further echoing
Grossman's position, he then stated:
Odds are slim that a user would enter a sex-
ually explicit site by accident. Unlike com-
munications received by radio or television,
'the receipt of information on the Internet
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requires a series of affirmative steps more
deliberate and directed than merely turning
a dial. A child requires some sophistication
and some ability to read to retrieve material
and thereby to use the Internet unattend-
ed.'
28
As a result, the Court held that, as an overly broad con-
tent-based restriction on speech, the CDA could not
withstand constitutional scrutiny.29 Accordingly, the
Court struck down the portions of the Act that aimed to
regulate pornographic content.
30
Formal regulation of spam has often received the
same sort of reception from the courts. In order to sup-
port (or supplant) customary law responses to spam,
many states have recently enacted laws that provide for
stiff penalties for spammers. However, two of these
state's courts have struck down these statutes on the
grounds that they unduly burden interstate com-
merce. 31
For instance, Washington legislators passed a statute
that prohibited the sending of spam that contained mis-
leading information in its subject line, used a third
party's domain name without permission, or misrepre-
sented the message's point of origin. 32 This statute also
required advertisers to find out whether the intended
recipient's address was registered to a Washington res-
ident. Advertisers could do this by contacting the
intended recipient's Internet domain registrant or
through other sources including public Internet directo-
ries. 33 Advertisers were then responsible for removing
all those who appeared on both lists from their solicita-
tion list.34 Stating that "the Washington Statute is
unduly restrictive and burdensome" on interstate com-
merce, however, the Washington Superior Court struck
down the anti-spam statute.
35
A California anti-spam statute experienced the same
fate. There, the state had enacted a law requiring bulk
e-mailers to include a valid return address on all unso-
licited mailings along with the letters "ADV" in the sub-
ject line of advertisments.3 6 Users would then be able to
reply to such mailings and request that they be exempt-
ed from the receipt of further messages-a request that,
once received, the spammer would be legally obligated
to honor.37 Again, however, a state court held that the
law could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
38
Of course, such results have not exactly put the
breaks on policy makers. In fact, legislation abounds
concerning the Internet. Both the federal and state leg-
islatures routinely feel the need to regulate something
on the Internet-from the high ideals of public morality
to the nitty-gritty details of spam-free inboxes. 3 9 And all
things considered, it's not hard to understand why leg-
islators wish to throw their hats in the ring of Internet
regulation. While customary law may have its continu-
ing uses, the changing face of the online world casts at
least some doubt as to its effectiveness against even the
most obvious and acknowledged problems.
Unfortunately, drafting a superior statute is not as
easy as it seems, and several early entries have fared no
better than their informal counterparts. In fact, many
have fared worse-after all, at least customary law can
stand in harmony with the Constitution. However tidy
regulatory theories may look at first glance, attempts to
regulate something as large and amorphous as the
Internet come riddled with problems. For instance, who
among us could have predicted the impact the Internet
would have on the music industry, or the craze of online
auctions? How are policy makers, whether politicians
or industry leaders, to keep up with something so
uncertain?n
0
Perhaps the answer is just this simple: they're not.
Taking into account their mutual (and multiple) fail-
ures, before our legislatures enact more regulations to
"save us" from the societal hazards presented by the
Internet, and before others declare the Internet "totally
safe as is," a closer look should be given to the stated
policy goals of the United States concerning the
Internet. Once the destination is known, the task of
choosing an appropriate path becomes somewhat easier.
In this case, a promising path appears to come in the
form of the FTC's pragmatic approach concerning
deceptive acts on the Internet. However, as will be
shown below, even this path is not complete as current-
ly drawn, and in order to reach the ultimate destina-
tion, a few novel trails may be required.
A PARADIGM FOR SUCCESS: THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION ACT
The United States has explicit policy goals for the
Internet. As stated by Congress, these goals include:
To promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer serv-
ices and interactive media; to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State Regulation; to encourage the
development of technologies which maximize
user control over what information is
received by individuals, families, and schools
who use the Internet and other interactive
computer services; to remove disincentives
for the development and utilization of block-
ing and filtering technologies that empower
parents to restrict their children's access to
objectionable or inappropriate online materi-
al; and to ensure vigorous enforcement of
Federal criminal laws to deter and punish
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harass-
ment by means of computer.
41
To date, the FTC has played an important role in
achieving these goals. As an independent agency creat-
ed by statute,42 the Commission enforces Section 5(a) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce. 43 The Act defines "deception" as an act or prac-
tice that is likely to mislead consumers, acting reason-
ably under the circumstances, about a material fact to
their detriment. 44 The Commission has the authority
where such deception exists to authorize its own attor-
neys to initiate federal district court proceedings in
order to secure such equitable relief as may be appro-
priate in each case.45 Section 13(b) of the FTC Act fur-
ther empowers courts to exercise the full breadth of
their equitable authority to grant relief concerning
deceptive trade practices. As one court explained:
Congress, when it gave the district court
authori-
ty to The FTC has taken the lead
grant a consisting mainly of res
perma- against companies comr
n e n t applying its traditional
injunc- action to the novel settin
t i o n generally avoided not onl
against political halls of Washing
v i o l a- dent in the wake of Reno
tions of
any provisions of law enforced by the
Commission, also gave the district court
authority to grant any ancillary relief neces-
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did not limit that traditional equitable power
explicitly or by necessary and inescapable
inference.
46
As a result, district courts may use their inherent
equitable authority under §13(b) to grant temporary
restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and any
additional preliminary relief necessary to preserve the
possibility of final, effective relief.
47
As suggested by the definition of "deception," the
FTC must prove three elements in order to secure such
relief in any case against a party allegedly engaged in
deceptive trade practices. These interrelated elements
require evidence of (1) an act likely to mislead (2) con-
sumers acting reasonably under the circumstances (3)
about a material fact to their detriment.
48
The issue when applying the first element of this test
is "whether the act or practice is likely to mislead,
rather than whether it causes actual deception."
49
Where there have been express claims, "the representa-
tion itself establishes the meaning."50  In cases of
implied claims, however, a detailed examination of the
representation, including an evaluation of such factors
as the entire document, the comparison of different sec-
tions of the document, the nature of the transaction,
and the nature of the claim, must be conducted in order
to judge it misleading. Courts may also consider extrin-
sic evidence when deciding whether an act or practice is
likely to mislead.
51
The second element demands that the court consider
the act or practice from the perspective of a reasonable
consumer. The totality of the practice should be consid-
ered when determining how a reasonable consumer
would act in the circumstances. 52 According to FTC pol-
icy: "To be
ole in pursuing legal remedies, considered
g orders and injunctive relief, r e a s o n-
these scams. Fortunately, in able, the
tive trade practices" cause of interpreta-
ed by the Internet, the FTC has tion or
nee-jerk reactionism seen in the reaction
t also the fear of regulation evi- does not
U. have to be
the only
one. When a seller's representation coveys more than
one meaning to reasonable consumers, one of which is
false, the seller is liable for the misleading interpreta-
tion."5 Furthermore, it is not necessary that the decep-
r{
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tion continue. The seller violates the law even if he
later discloses the truth to the buyer.
54
The third element of the test focuses on the materi-
ality of the deception. "A 'material' misrepresentation
or practice is one likely to affect a consumer's choice of,
or conduct regarding, a product."55 In other words, if
consumers are likely to have chosen differently but for
the deception then a misrepresentation is material.
56
When combined with qualities or actions fulfilling the
first two elements of the test, a material misrepresen-
tation equates to a deceptive trade practice under the
FTC Act.
While novel in technological respects, scams like
cyberjacking and mousetrapping tend to implicate tra-
ditional legal doctrines of fraud and deceptive trade
practices. For instance, "deceptive door opener" ads,
which seek to draw customers into a store by offering
products that are not in stock, have long been recog-
nized by the FTC and the courts as violative of the Act.
57
Obviously, luring unsuspecting web surfers to unin-
tended destinations from which they cannot escape
(most likely but not necessarily pornographic sites)
would seem to be directly analogous to, if not much
more egregious than, "deceptive door opener" advertis-
ing.5 8 Imagine, for example, going to a local electronics
store in hopes of purchasing a DVD player listed in a
sales flyer and discovering not only that the store did
not carry the player, but also that it had suddenly been
converted to an X-rated bookstore-and that, no matter
what you said or did, it refused to let you leave its park-
ing lot.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the FTC has
taken the lead role in pursuing legal remedies, consist-
ing mainly of restraining orders and injunctive relief,
against companies committing these scams.
Fortunately, in applying its traditional "deceptive trade
practices" cause of action to the novel setting created by
the Internet, the FTC has generally avoided not only
the knee-jerk reactionisim seen in the political halls of
Washington, but also the fear of regulation evident in
the wake of Reno v. ACLU.59 Rather, it has simply fol-
lowed the sound legal principal of adapting existing
laws to new circumstances-and in doing so, shown
that existing laws can be used effectively to address the
problems posed by the Internet. In all, the FTC has
prosecuted more than one hundred cases of Internet
scams. One such case is discussed in detail below.
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN ACTION:
FTC v. PEREIRA
In 1999, University of Massachusetts Professor
David Landrigan uncovered a cyber-scam, like the one
in the introductory example, responsible for luring
unsuspecting web surfers to pornography sites and
trapping them there. When MSNBC reported
Landrigan's findings, FTC lawyers initiated an investi-
gation of their own.60 They eventually uncovered what
the agency has declared as "maybe the most pernicious"
Internet scam they have ever encountered.
6 1
Carlos Pereira, one of the defendants, used the tech-
niques of cyberjacking and mousetrapping to snare
unsuspecting Internet users, take them to pornograph-
ic websites, and hinder them from leaving by disabling
their computer's Internet browser functions.62 For such
a deviously effective scam, the execution of Pereira's
plan could have been performed by virtually anyone
proficient in basic web design and Java6 3 programming.
First, he copied legitimate webpages that contained
commonly searched-for terms, such as names of recent
movies, kids games, or even general words like "pie."
He then changed one single line of the JavaScript pro-
gramming language in the copied pages, inserting the
following redirection command: "<script language=
'JavaScript'> window.location= 'http://www.taboosis-
ters.com/'. 64 Though it may look incomprehensible to
the novice user, such alterations are matters of routine
for web designers that need to redirect surfers to other
web locations.6 5
Having made the above changes, Pereira needed only
to wait for users' Internet searches to reveal the copied
pages. To explain, when a search term is submitted to
a search engine, the engine processes the term through
a self-created index of websites and generates a list of
sites related to the term.66 This process is facilitated by
the use of metatags, which websites use to describe
their content, thereby ensuring that they will be accu-
rately indexed by search engines, and in turn, that
users who wish to find them can.
Ironically, Pereira recognized that he could use this
accuracy to threaten the reliability of the metatag sys-
tem. For instance, if cyber-scam artists cyberjack a
website that sells flowers and repost it with a redirect
command, the metatags-things like florists, flowers,
mail order, roses, etc.-will still allow users searching
with any of those terms to locate the page. If they
attempt to retrieve it, however, they will be taken to the
location specified in the redirect. In other words, the
user searches for florists, finds florists, but actually
arrives at a website that advertises anything but flow-
ers. It is easy to see how a small cyber-startup business
could also use this technique to lure the consumer away
from, say FTD.com, to their small lesser-known cyber-
store.
In the Pereira's version of the scam, the "bait" so to
speak was not flowers, but children's games. In his
investigation, Dean Forbes, attorney for the FTC, used
the AltaVista search engine to perform an innocent
search for "kids Internet games. '67 Some of the results
of the search, including a page entitled "Kids Internet
Games - Home Page," seemed legitimate. 6 However,
when Forbes tried to visit several of the sites, he
revealed the deception. One link took him to <www.ata-
i te-net note
riz.com/c_141.htm>, another to
<www.tabooanal.com/c_141.htm>-both of which were
pornography sites run by co-defendant W.T.F.R.C. Pty
Ltd. (WTFRC). Turning his attention to the source code
for the original webpages and the copies created by
cyberjacking, Forbes further discovered that the copies
contained "virtually the same content as the original,
including the web page title, and 'keyword' and 'descrip-
tion' metatags . ,,69 In all, the FTC tracked down over
25 million fraudulent webpages based on cyberjacked
sites.70 These fraudulent webpages contained not only
information about Internet kids games, but also infor-
mation about pies, folk music, cars, movie reviews,
sports information, business classifieds, and numerous
other topics.71
Once users trying to visit these sites were redirected
to their falsified counterparts, the second part of the
scam took over. Having lured unsuspecting users to a
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pornographic website, Pereira then held them captive
by using JavaScript commands to mousetrap users in
the ring of WTFRC's sites. For example, normally users
can click on either the "back" or "close" button in their
browsers in order to remove themselves from any given
website. Doing so once caught in defendants' scam,
however, merely led the users to another pornography
site using the simple redirect code.
Having discovered the scam, the FTC petitioned the
court for a permanent injunction and other equitable
relief pursuant to §13 of the FTC Act. The Commission
also moved
for a tempo- Where it can, the FTC has ser
r a r y goals of United States well. I
restraining limited resources, and cannot
order pur- Internet in an efficient way
suant to Pereira. Moreover, the mecb
Federal Rule make it difficult for the FTC tc
of Civil this type.
Procedure
65(b)(2). When evaluating a request for preliminary
injunctive relief in a Section 13(b) case, courts apply the
"public interest" test, which requires them to: (1) weigh
the equities and (2) find that the FTC is likely to suc-
ceed on the merits.72 Thus, the test for the FTC in pur-
suing both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
against Pereira, his co-defendants ultimately boiled
down to the familiar test for deceptive trade practices:
(1) an act likely to mislead (2) consumers acting reason-
ably under the circumstances (3) about a material fact
to their detriment. As such, the FTC's case was not dif-
ficult to make.
Applying the elements of the deceptive trade prac-
tices to the acts of cyberjacking and mousetraping was
straightforward. First, the FTC needed to show that
cyberjacking and mousetraping are likely to mislead.
As it is, the simple use of false metatags to lure con-
sumers to sites on the Internet has been found decep-
tive by itself. In Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring
Services, the court granted a preliminary injunction
against a company that had placed false information in
their metatags. This false information, found the court,
resulted in the deceptive redirecting of consumers to the
wrong website.
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Of course, in order to prompt consumers to visit
WTFRC's pornographic sites, Pereira misrepresented
the true identity of their websites through more egre-
gious ways than simple metatag misrepresentations.
Pereira mislead online consumers through creatively
employing legitimate Internet technology and the actu-
al theft of other business's websites. The search engine
results for the stolen webpages were virtually mirror
images of the results for the original webpages. In this
way, Pereira's cyberjacking scheme created "door open-
ers" on the Internet. As mentioned previously, such
"door openers" are deceptive by law.
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More broadly, Pereira and his co-defendants' cyber-
jacking itself was deceptive to the reasonable consumer.
When consumers use
,ved the Internet policy
However, the FTC has
continue to police the
through actions like
Lanics of the FTC Act
search engines to look for
information on the Internet
by entering words common-
ly associated with the
sought-after information,
stop deceptive acts of they must be said to act
reasonably. Furthermore,
the use of the mousetrap-
ping technique is not reasonably avoidable because con-
sumers have no warning of what is about to happen to
them. Nor can they do anything about it once they dis-
cover the trick, as their browsers no longer function
properly. In other words, once hijacked to defendant
WTFRC's adult sites, consumers (including children)
cannot avoid being trapped in the site-which, at least
in Pereira's version of the scam meant looking at
pornography, whether they have any inclination to do so
or not.
Redirecting consumers to pornography sites materi-
ally undermines the consumers' ability to find the infor-
mation or goods they are looking for. The materiality
can be measured in the consumer's time, their loss of
confidence in the Internet, and most importantly in the
emotional costs that might affect children. Due to the
increase in Internet commerce, this poses a direct
threat to a major section of the American economy.
Lastly, the practice of luring consumers to websites
they never wanted to visit, and then trapping them
there has few if any public benefits-economic or other-
wise. The only benefits derived from this scheme go to
unscrupulous opportunists who likely receive revenues
for each site visit or click-through. Unhindered,
schemes like this one will denigrate the integrity of the
Internet.
AMENDING THE PARADIGM: A PRIVATE
CAUSE OF ACTION
Where it can, the FTC has served the Internet policy
goals of United States well. However, the FTC has lim-
ited resources and cannot continue to police the
Internet in an efficient way through actions like
Pereira. Moreover, the mechanics of the FTC Act make
it difficult for the FTC to stop deceptive acts of this type.
The problem lies in the statutory scheme by which the
FTC brings an action. To be sure, the FTC's "efforts are
directed toward stopping actions that threaten con-
sumers' opportunities to exercise informed choice."
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However, the FTC "cannot act to resolve individual
problems," but may intervene only when a "pattern of
possible law violations develop. ' '76 Considering factors
such as the sheer volume of business, the ease of imple-
menting deceptive practices, the potential scope of
deception in a market such as the Internet, and the
exponential growth of Internet commerce, the selective,
slow, and often cumbersome FTC policies of enforce-
ment do not provide adequate protection for consumers
in this new marketplace.
The ultimate answer may just be to combine of all the
regulatory means discussed above into one simple end:
a private federal cause of action under the FTC Act.
Availability of private enforcement would give con-
sumers the opportunity-and with the structure dis-
cussed below, the incentive-to pursue acts of deception
and fraud on the Internet, while simultaneously deter-
ring, and imposing responsibility for, bad acts by online
businesses. Furthermore, these types of private actions
avoid the two most frequent problems encountered by
regulators. First, the First Amendment free speech
problem, as seen in Reno v. ACLU, does not exist when
private individuals, rather than the government, per-
form the "regulatory" function. Second, the constitu-
tional issues regarding interstate commerce, as seen in
state attempts to regulate spam, obviously would not
undermine the legitimacy of a cause of action brought
pursuant to federal law. Therefore, a private federal
cause of action based on the FTC Act would allow for
timely, effective, constitutional regulation of the
Internet, without sacrificing the qualities named in the
Congressional policy statement.
State consumer protection statutes-commonly
known as Uniform Deceptive Acts and Practices
(UDAP) statutes-give ample precedent for such an
i: te ne n te
action, providing as they do for private causes of action
for deceptive and fraudulent practices in the market-
place. These state statutes and their progeny of case
law also lend federal lawmakers diverse examples to
guide them in appropriately amending the FTC Act to
include a private cause of action.
Most UDAP statutes follow the lead of one of three
model statutes: the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act (UDTPA),77 the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices
Act (UCSPA),7 8 or the Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law (UTP-CPL).79 The UDTPA
provides for a private cause of action in that "a person"
likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice may
be granted an injunction under principles of equity and
on terms that the court considers reasonable.8 0 Proof of
monetary damage, loss of profits, or intent to deceive is
not required.8 1 The UDTPA also provides for allowance
of costs and the award of attorneys' fees.
2
The UCSPA affords an even greater scope of private
remedies. The UCSPA allows "a consumer" to bring an
action for a declaratory judgment, an injunction, or the
greater of actual damages or $100.83 Like the UDTPA,
the UCSPA allows for the recovery of attorneys' fees.
8 4
However, under the UCSPA consumers can collect attor-
neys' fees only if they are the prevailing party.8 5
The third, and most recent, of these model statutes is
the UTP-CPL. Developed jointly by the FTC and a
committee of the Council of State Governments, this
"little FTC Act" combines sections of the FTC Act with
sections of the two models discussed above. It starts
with §5(a)(1) of the FTC Act, then adds concepts of
deceptive and prohibited practices from the UDTPA and
UCSPA to provide a total of nineteen unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
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Of course, while legislatures are free to adopt these
models in their entireties, many states have produced
significant differences in both the language and appli-
cation of their UDAP statutes. For Congress, these
unique state products simply provide more models on
which to base amendments to the FTC Act. Moreover,
since each state's version comes with a history of use,
Congress can choose among the varying options by look-
ing to the degree of success achieved by each.
From among the many contenders, Arizona's UDAP
statute provides federal legislators with an excellent
example of an effective privatization of consumer pro-
tection enforcement. In DunlaD v. Jimmy GMC of
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Tucson, Inc., the Arizona Court of Appeals applied the
state's UDAP statute in a pragmatic way by providing
injured consumers with an implied private cause of
action against a violator of the Act. 87 Citing Sellinger v.
Freeway, s s the Court also reaffirmed the award of puni-
tive damages in a private enforcement of the statute.
The Court stated that "punitive damages are appropri-
ate where the wrongdoer's conduct is wanton or reck-
less, shows spite or ill will, or where the conduct demon-




Law will always travel one step behind technology.
Given that the Internet seems to spawn some new tech-
nological advance almost daily, it would be foolish to
expect to find a perfect solution to all of the ills it also
creates. Thus, it is perhaps unfair to condemn ineffec-
tual customary law and unconstitutional governmental
regulation for their mutual failure to achieve the impos-
sible.
But such a caveat neither should nor does preclude
the search for a better solution. For the reasons dis-
cussed in this Note, a private federal cause of action
under the FTC Act might be just that-not a perfect
solution, but a better one. While it won't cure every
perceived problem in the online world, such an action
would likely succeed where plenty of predecessors have
failed. It would do so by blending the efforts of individ-
ual users found in customary law with the legislative
prescriptions for a free but fair Internet found in con-
gressional enactments-and applying the mix to the
FTC's administration of the FTC Act. Furthermore,
encouraging use of the private action by offering puni-
tive damages and attorneys' fees for victorious plaintiffs
would provide the most effective form of deterrence
against online deception, and thus, the most effective
protection for both the Internet itself and its users. A
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